Introduction
Current reforms of agricultural policies in OECD countries involve important changes in policy objectives from national self-sufficiency goals towards the provision of environmental benefits. This shift of emphasis is also increasingly reflected in agricultural budgets for agrienvironment schemes (e.g. OECD, 2004) . From an economic perspective, the new policy objectives have important implications for agricultural policy design and in particular for the scientific information that is required to design efficient agricultural land use policies.
First, agricultural policy can no longer be based solely on the analysis and understanding of agricultural markets. To efficiently allocate public resources to the provision of environmental services requires information about the externalities of agricultural land use as perceived by the taxpayers. Environmental economists have invested much effort into the development of non-market valuation techniques, such as the contingent valuation method, to measure these externalities (e.g. Randall, 2002) . However, work by psychologists and economists shows that these measures remain unreliable (e.g. Schkade and Payne, 1994; List and Gallet, 2001; Schläpfer et al., 2004 ). An alternative to measuring economic benefits and damages using stated preference techniques is to estimate demand functions for public goods and services using collective choice approaches (e.g., Shapiro and Deacon, 1996) . One way to do this is by analysing ballot decisions on propositions involving public goods (e.g. Deacon and Shapiro, 1975) , another is by estimating demand functions that relate local expenditures for public goods to characteristics of the local population using a median voter framework (e.g. Borcherding and Deacon, 1972) . Estimated demand functions include the traditional economic variables, (tax) price and income, and provide information about how differences in individual income and tax burden affect the preferred quantity of the local public service.
Knowledge of individual demand functions can be useful for many purposes, including the computation of tax structures and expenditure levels which satisfy certain normative criteria (Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973) . In contrast to thriving applications of stated preference surveys to landscape management issues, there have not been any collective choice based studies to estimate demand for landscape management services to date. The collective choice literature on demands for public goods and services is still largely limited to the traditional local public services, such as schools, police, fire protection or city parks. A first aim of the present study is to explore the potential of a median voter approach for characterizing the demand for agri-environmental services.
Second, in contrast to national food security and other traditional public-good benefits, many of the environmental benefits of agriculture do not have the character of national public goods, but can be considered as services to regional or even local populations. This situation poses new challenges to the design of efficient agricultural policy. Uniform national application of environmental standards and provision of public goods will in general not be efficient (Evans et al., 2003; Flury et al., 2005) . On the other hand, local public benefits suggest an opportunity to pursue efficient allocation through decentralized decision-making and financing by sub-federal governments based on the theory of fiscal federalism (Olsen, 1965) . Theoretically, local agri-environmental decision-making may result in a highly desirable adaptation of public spending to locally varying demands (e.g. Stiglitz, 2000) .
Agricultural policies in the past have mostly been implemented at national and supra-national levels. Recently, however, Swiss agri-environmental policy has introduced a 'federalistic' element by enacting the Eco-Quality Directive in 2001. This directive established a programme to provide financial support for land managers if the land management outcome fulfils specific ecological criteria concerning floristic composition and habitat connectivity (Federal Council, 2001) . Support through grants from the national government is conditioned on the prior passage of a local landscape development concept and 10-30 percent cost sharing by the cantonal government. This programme provides a unique opportunity to empirically explore the potential of decentralized decision-making for efficient agri-environmental policy.
Thus, a second aim of the present study is to investigate if the local levels of landscape management services due to the new cantonal programme reflect cantonal demands better than those of a national programme with similar objectives which had been introduced to Swiss agricultural policy in 1991.
The empirical analyses in this study are based on the 2002 and 2003 data for cantonal and federal programmes to provide landscape management services in Switzerland. The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2, a median voter model is applied to estimate the income and price elasticities of demand for two programmes implemented by the cantonal governments; Section 3 investigates if the cantonal provision of a public service is more responsive to cantonal demands than the national provision of a similar public service. Conclusions are presented in Section 4.
Demand estimation in a median voter framework

Conceptual framework
The economic theory of fiscal federalism takes local political jurisdictions as behavioural entities whose tax and expenditure decisions may be neither efficient nor fair. Policy interventions by central governments, generally via intergovernmental grants, have been recommended to correct these failures (Oates, 1972) . To optimally design such policies, predictive models of local government fiscal choice are needed.
The most prominent specification of local fiscal choice is the median voter model proposed by Bowen (1943) , conceptually enriched by Downs (1957) and first used for theory-based econometric analysis by Barr and Davis (1966) , Borcherding and Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) . In its empirically most useful form, the median voter model hypothesizes a given tax schedule and a single public service for which consumer-voters have single-peaked preferences. Voters can be ordered along a continuum from low to high demanders of the public service, which results in a distribution of votes by these preferred levels of the public service. The rule for local fiscal choice is that a service level is chosen that will defeat all others in a majority rule election. Under these assumptions, the preferred level of local services will be the median of the quantities demanded by the individual voters (see e.g. Borcherding and Deacon, 1972) .
To use the Bowen-Downs median voter model to empirically identify the crucial median service quantity, it is further assumed that the median quantity is the quantity demanded by the consumer-voter with the median income. Adding this additional assumption produces an analytically powerful proposition: Given these (five) assumptions, governments will select their budgetary levels 'as if' to maximize the well-being of each jurisdiction's median income family. This proposition stands as political economy's counterpart to the market economy's supposition that firms are profit maximisers (e.g. see Inman 1978) . If true, or approximately true, this proposition provides a powerful starting point for positive and normative analysis of government behaviour. In effect, the individual utility maximising model applied to the median income family can be used to analyse the fiscal performance of non-federal governments (Deacon, 1978; Inman, 1978) .
The median voter framework for the economic analysis of government spending has not remained unchallenged (Mueller, 2003, p. 243 ff.) . To date, few studies have examined if median voter predictions outperform predictions based on traditional 'ad hoc' models that explain government spending based on mean income and other characteristics of local jurisdictions, which ignores public choice considerations. Pommerehne and Frey (1976) found that median income worked somewhat better at explaining local public expenditures than did mean income. Pommerehne (1978) found that median income performed significantly better in municipalities that make decision via direct, town-meeting procedures but not in municipalities using representative democratic procedures. Even the existence of an optional or obligatory referendum on expenditure bills in cities governed by representative assemblies added enough of a constraint on representatives' behaviour to make the median voter model perform perceptibly better than for those cities in which representative democracy was able to function unchecked. Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1982, p. 544) determined that, within cross-sectional units, higher-income individuals did not appear to have any greater taste for public spending. The positive income elasticities in cross sections were due entirely to a positive association between community income and expenditures, i.e. the relationship that the traditional approach estimated and the public choice approach sought to improve upon (Mueller, 2003, p. 245) . Rigorous recent econometric tests of the median voter income and tax price variables in an expenditure model tended to reject the median voter model at the state and county level, but not at the municipal level (Turnbull and Mitias, 1999 ).
The present analysis responds to these challenges in two important ways. First, in response to the objections by Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1982) , it examines only public services related to landscape management. This 'class' of public services has been found to exhibit a positive income elasticity of demand based on Swiss voting decisions (Schläpfer and Hanley, 2003; Schläpfer and Witzig, 2006) . The assumption that median quantity is the quantity demanded by the consumer-voter with the median income may therefore be reasonably well realized with this type of public service. Second, in response to Pommerehne's (1978) evidence that the introduction of representative decision-making may weaken the relationship between median voter preferences and final outcomes, the present study explicitly examines if there is a difference between estimates from jurisdictions employing direct democratic decision elements and those jurisdictions without such decision elements.
Empirical framework
The sample consists of 25 cantons. Among the 26 Swiss cantons (including the half-cantons) the half-canton of Basel City is omitted in the analysis as it does not have an open landscape.
Multiple regression is used to fit the following function (omitting indices i=1,...25 for the cantons):
where: 
Measurement of variables
Data for expenditures on eco-quality (X EQ ) and agriculturally utilised land area ( The binary variable for the presence/absence of direct democratic procedures in the cantons is based on the composite index for direct democratic rights used by Frey and Stutzer (2000) , which is based on Trechsel and Serdült (1999) . The dummy variable D was coded 1 if the index was 4 or higher, and 0 if the index was below 4 (in nine cases).
Description of the landscape management programmes
The eco-quality (EQ) payments based on the recent 'Eco-Quality Directive' of the federal Law on Agriculture were introduced in 2001 (Federal Parliament, 1998; Federal Council, 2001 ). The programme was designed as an outcome-oriented incentive scheme to compensate farmers for providing elevated levels of floristic diversity and elevated habitat connectivity (Federal Council, 2001) . Criteria for participation are determined by the cantonal authorities, but must comply with minimal requirements of the national authorities. Payments for habitat connectivity require that the farmland being supported is part of a local landscape development concept which has to be approved by the cantonal authorities. 
Results and discussion
The models estimated to explain cantonal expenditure levels (per-hectare expenditures in a canton) for the eco-quality and the nature protection services are presented in Table 1 .
Results are reported for four model specifications, which address each of the four questions stated above.
In the simple linear model -including median tax price and median income -the income variable is significant in both programmes and both years ( Finally, the income elasticity of landscape management services obtained by estimating the median voter model in its logarithmic form (with the dependent and the independent variables transformed) are in the range of 4 to 6 (Model 4). This is about twice the magnitude estimated by Borcherding and Deacon (1972) for the service 'parks and recreation'. This high income elasticity could be interpreted as evidence that landscape amenities management is an extreme luxury good. The price elasticity estimate was not significantly different from zero in any of the models.
Although the number of observations in the cross section is small and the empirical evidence for the validity of median voter theory is limited, the analyses shed some light on the relationships between income, price and levels of public expenditure for landscape management in a federal system. However, great caution should be exercised in drawing any conclusions that would rely on a collective choice mechanism as hypothesized in the median voter framework.
Private demand and public provision through cantonal and national government
Conceptual framework
The local provision of public services has the potential to promote an adaptation of the supply of local services to local demands (e.g. Olsen, 1965) . If the "political market" model of public choice theorists applies, then one would expect that the level of public service is higher in jurisdictions with a great aggregate demand for the public service and lower in jurisdictions with a smaller aggregate demand.
Agri-environmental support for landscape management services in Switzerland is provided through programmes financed by the national government as well as through the new eco-quality programme, described in Section 2, which is financed by cantonal governments (with matching grants from the national government). Therefore, an interesting empirical question is whether the provision of the public service better reflects local demands when the service is provided through the cantonal government compared to the national government.
To examine the hypothesis of a more demand-oriented cantonal provision of public landscape management services, this section examines the relationship between levels of the public service (expenditures per hectare of agricultural land) and important likely determinants of the aggregate demand for the public services. These determinants are primarily population density because the per capita costs of maintaining a certain land management standard decrease with population density, and per capita income. Furthermore, the demand may be indicated by the voter support in past popular referenda concerned with the introduction of agri-environmental policy.
Empirical framework
The following function is estimated using linear regression:
where Q = quantity of the public service in a canton, P = population density in a canton, Y = per capita income in a canton (in thousand CHF), E = measure of voter demand for national agri-environmental policy in a canton, and β = coefficients of variables.
As in section 2, Q is measured in CHF expended by a canton for a particular public service 1996) proposition explicitly conditioned direct payments on a set of ecological requirements and was approved by a large majority (78 percent) of the votes (Günter et al., 2002) . The difference between approval rates can therefore be interpreted as an index for the demand for national agri-environmental policy.
Description of the landscape management programmes
The "general direct payments" (GD) include all cross-compliance payments according to the 'Direct Payment Directive' (Federal Council, 1998) . These payments are based on amount of agricultural land and heads of farm animals managed according to the provisions of the "proof of ecological services", which concerns nutrient balance, minimal percentage of land in ecological set-aside areas, and restrictions on pesticide use. These general (as opposed to the more targeted ecological) direct payments constitute the largest bulk of direct payments to Swiss farmers (see descriptive statistics in Table 2 ).
The ecological direct payments (ED) are also based on the Direct Payment Directive (Federal Council, 1998) and comprise land management payments for ecological compensation areas, such as nutrient-poor grassland, hedgerows, and orchards (Federal Council, 1998) .
The eco-quality payments (EQ) are those based on the Eco-Quality Directive described in Section 2. Table   2 .
Data
Question
The specific question examined is whether or not the expenditures of the cantonal programme (EQ) are more strongly related to the set of independent variables than the expenditures of the two national programmes. The expectation is that independent variables are positive and significant in the cantonal programme but insignificant in the national programmes. For each programme, the null hypothesis of no association between expenditures and the independent variables was tested.
Results and discussion
For a view of the data, Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the cantonal levels of public services and voter support for national agri-environmental policy as measured by ECOVOTE. While the general direct payments do not show any relationship with voter demand for agri-environmental policy ( Fig. 1a ; correlation coefficient r=0.002, p=0.817), the ecological direct payments (r=0.409, p=0.042) and the eco-quality payments (r=0.331, p=0.106) are slightly positively associated with voter support for agri-environmental policy (Fig. 1b, c.) .
The results of ordinary least squares regressions are presented in Table 3 . The national 'general direct payments' (GD) were not significantly related to any of the variables. This was expected because the results refer to a programme that is financed by the national government, but does not provide higher budgets where landscape management services are in high demand. Population density and income even tended to be negatively related to the payments of the programme per hectare, although the coefficients were not significant at conventional levels. Based on the R 2 values, the proportion of explained variance in the dependent variable is very modest.
The local level of national ecological direct payments (ED) was significantly positively associated with both population density and income. The hypotheses that these variables do not affect ED were rejected. The cantonal levels of this public service thus appeared to be related to the cantonal demands, although the cantonal governments did not have a direct influence on the level of this service. Voter support for national agrienvironmental policy, which was correlated with both income (r=0.39) and population density (r=0.29), did not provide any further explanation of ED.
The level of the eco-quality programme (EQ) was positively associated with cantonal income, but negatively related to population density (Table 3) . While the first result appears to support the hypothesis of a cantonal "political market," which may govern the expenditures for this programme, the latter result strongly contradicts this hypothesis. In this model, the ECOVOTE coefficient was not significantly different from zero (t-statistic of 1.2). However, it is important to consider that the eco-quality programme was only recently introduced and still represents only a very small fraction of the total public expenditures for agriculture (see scale of y-axis in Fig. 1) . Therefore, the local expenditure decisions for this programme may not yet receive sufficient political attention for a well functioning political market to evolve.
Overall, the comparison of model results for ED and EQ services provides no evidence for a more 'demand-oriented' provision of land management services when the programme is implemented by the cantons rather than by the national government. On the contrary, the national ecological direct payment programme appears to reflect aggregate cantonal demands better, although there is no obvious mechanism to explain this result. One possible explanation of this result is that social norms induced farmers in high-income, densely populated cantons to provide more of the services that are supported through the national ecological direct payments, such as hedgerows, orchards or low-input species-rich grassland.
Conclusions
Central governments usually lack sufficient information about the demands for public services with public good characteristics. Where public good benefits accrue primarily to local or regional populations and taxpayers, decentralized decision-making can improve efficient allocation of budgets because local decisions are more likely to reflect local taxpayer demands. Agricultural policy in Switzerland has begun to make use of this potential advantage by offering matching grants for a new type of landscape management service provided by cantonal governments. The cantonal expenditures for this programme, along with those for land management services based on a nature protection law, provided an opportunity to estimate parameters of the demand for landscape management services using a collective choice framework.
While the income elasticity of the demand for landscape management services was very high in the median voter model, the price elasticity was not significantly different from zero. The absence of a negative price elasticity casts some doubt on the appropriateness of using the median voter model to explain the cantonal expenditures for landscape management services in Switzerland. Interestingly, Borcherding and Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) likewise report insignificant price elasticities for the service 'parks and recreation' which, among the services previously analysed, most closely resembles those examined in the present study. There was no evidence to support the hypothesis that cantonal provision of landscape management services in Switzerland would be more responsive to cantonal demands than national provision. Surprisingly, the national provision of landscape management services was more strongly related to the proxies for cantonal demands than cantonal provision. The mechanisms underlying this result are currently unclear and represent an important issue for future research. One hypothesis could be that regional differences in farmers' acceptance of landscape management incentive schemes may drive the observed patterns.
The present analyses rely on a small dataset. Further empirical analysis of regional agri-environmental policy programmes is needed before more definitive conclusions can be drawn about the efficiency of decentralized decision-making for agri-environmental policies in Switzerland, Europe, and other OECD countries. Due to the national or even supra-national scale of most agricultural policies, the database for such analysis is currently weak. More experimentation with decentralised agri-environmental policies would be highly desirable for future research on taxpayer demands for agri-environmental policies. Notes: There are 25 observations in the dataset. The unit of the dependent variables is annual expenditures (CHF) per hectare of agriculturally used land. Significance levels: *** for p<0.01; ** for p<0.05; and * for p<0.1 
